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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
CONSTI'UTIONAL LAW-SovER]GN ImmuNrrY oF STATE AGENCY.
-P brought an action against D, a state agency authorized by the
legislature to sue and be sued, for damages resulting from alleged
negligence in construction of the West Virginia Turnpike. The cir-
cuit court sustained a demurrer to the declaration, on the ground
that D is a state agency exercising essential governmental functions
and so is immune from tort liability, and certified the question of
immunity to the Supreme Court of Appeals. Held, that, even
though D may be exercising governmental functions, it is not such
an agency of the state as to be entitled to immunity from suit or
action. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. West Virginia Turnpike Comm'n,
105 S.E.2d 680 (W. Va. 1958).
The West Virginia constitution provides that "The State of
West Virginia shall never be made defendant in any court of law
or equity. . ." except as garnishee or suggestee. W. VA. CONST.
art. VI, § 85. This provision is absolute, and the immunity extends
to all governmental agencies of the state. Stewart v. State Road
Comm'n, 117 W. Va. 352, 185 S.E. 567 (1936). Although this man-
date is clear and unambiguous, the courts have found considerable
difficulty in determining just when an action or suit against a state
officer or agency has the effect of making the state defendant.
On the lower-municipal and county-levels, immunity gener-
ally depends upon whether the activity out of which the litigation
arose is a governmental or proprietary function. If it is proprietary,
the action may be maintained. Ward v. County Court, 141 W. Va.
730, 93 S.17.2d 44 (1956). If the function is governmental, the action
or suit must be dismissed. Shaffer v. Monongalia Gen. Hosp., 135
W. Va. 16, 62 S.E.2d 795 (1950). Courts, however, exercise con-
siderable discretion in determining what is governmental and what
proprietary. There is a rebuttable presumption that the function is
governmental. Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va. 828, 30 S.E.2d
726 (1944:); see also, Ward v. County Court, supra; Van Gilder v.
Morgantown, 136 W. Va. 831, 68 S.E.2d 746 (1949); Shaffer v.
Monongalia Gen. Hosp., supra.
A state officer acting wthin the scope of his authority is gener-
ally immune from suit. Hardy v. Simpson, 118 W. Va. 440, 190 S.E.
680 (1937). If he acts wrongfully, however, he has exceeded his
authority, and may be held personally liable. Watts v. State Road
Comm'n, 117 W. Va. 398, 185 S.E. 570 (1936) (dictum). He may
also be compelled by mandamus to perform a duty required by law.
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State ex rel. Summers v. Sims, 97 S.E.2d 295 (W. Va. 1957); Hardy
v. Simpson, supra. The officer may also be subjected to suit when
its object is not to direct his discretion or affect an established mone-
tary or proprietary interest of the state. Walter Butler Bldg. Co. v.
Soto, 97 S.E.2d 275 (W. Va. 1957); Douglass v. Koontz, 187 W. Va.
345, 71 S.E.2d 319 (1952); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Shaid, 103 W.
Va. 432, 137 S.E. 878 (1927); cf. Hamill v. Koontz, 184 W. Va. 439,
59 S.E.2d 879 (1950). The state's interest must be direct and
immediate, not merely incidental or consequential, to bar suit
against an officer. Coal & Coke Ry. v. Conley, 67 W. Va. 129, 67
S.E. 613 (1910). However, if he is only a nominal party, and the
true purpose of the suit is to enjoin the state, it cannot be main-
tained. Blue Jacket Consol. Copper Co. v. Scherr, 50 W. Va. 533,
40 S.E. 514 (1901). "The state acts only by officers, and where the
action against them is based on no personal interest, but only be-
cause officers, and the liability falls, not on them, but the state, the
state is the real party." Miller v. State Board of Agriculture, 46 W.
Va. 192, 193, 32 S.E. 1007, 1008 (1899). Accord, Johnson v. State
Board of Agriculture, 46 W. Va. 196, 32 S.E. 1039 (1899).
When the defendant is a state board or commission, possibly
created as a public corporation with the right to sue and be sued,
the criteria for immunity are much the same as for a state officer.
Here, however, the "governmental" nature of the agency's activity
may be secondary to the origin and application of funds used in
the agency's operations. An agency exercising governmental func-
tions may not be sued for specific performance of a contract, nor for
damages for its breach. Schippa v. West Virginia Liquor Control
Comm'n, 132 W. Va. 51, 53 S.E.2d 609 (1948); State ex rel. Gordon
v. State Board of Control, 85 W. Va. 739, 102 S.E. 688 (1920); Miller
Supply Co. v. State Board of Control, 72 W. Va. 524, 78 S.E. 672
(1913). Neither is it liable for a tort Armacost v. Conservation
Comm'n, 126 F. Supp. 414 (S.D.W. Va. 1954); Mahone v. State
Road Comm'n, 99 W. Va. 397, 129 S.E. 820 (1925); Barber v. Spen-
cer State Hosp., 95 W. Va. 463, 121 S.E. 497 (1924). The rule ap-
pears to be otherwise, however, when the agency collects and dis-
burses its own funds without dependence upon the state's treasury
or the state's faith and credit even though the activity might well be
considered or declared "governmental." Guaranty Trust Co. v. West
Virginia Turnpike Comm'n, 109 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.W. Va. 1952);
Hope Natural Gas Co. v. West Virginia Turnpike Comnn, supra;
Tompkins v. Kanawha Board, 19 W. Va. 257 (1881); of. City of
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Charleston v. Southeastern Constr. Co., 134 W. Va. 666, 64 S.E.2d
676 (1950); Schippa v. West Virginia Liquor Control Comnn.
supra. It might be noted here that when a state agency is a suitor,
a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction will be enter-
tained, providing it is not in excess of the state's claim. State Road
Commr'n v. Ball, 138 W. Va. 349, 76 S.E.2d 55 (1953); State, by
Davis v. Ruthbell Coal Co., 133 W. Va. 319, 56 S.E.2d 549 (1949).
While the concept of sovereign immunity may not be desirable
in modern society, so long as the present constitutional provision
prevails, -the courts will be called upon to decide when an action or
suit has the effect of making the state defendant. It appears that
the established principles are adequate for reaching such decisions,
although it would seem that some of the past decisions have resulted
from misapplication of these principles.
R. G. D.
EvrDENCE-ADmIssIoNs AN CONFESSIONs DIsTINGuIsI.-D was
convicted of armed robbery. When D was taken into custody by
police officers he made a statement of his activities on the evening
of the alleged crime, in which statement he admitted eating food
which contained garlic. At the trial a witness, who was at the scene
of the robbery, testified that the odor of garlic emanated from one
of the accused. The trial court admitted into evidence the state-
ment made by D as a confession. Held, that the statement made by
D was technically an admission and not a confession; however, since
the trial court determined that the statement was voluntarily made,
it was admissible as substantive evidence of the activities described
therein. State v. Buffa, 51 N.J. Super. 218, 148 A.2d 833 (1958).
Although a distinction exists between admissions and confes-
sions, the courts have been inclined to treat them interchangeably.
It should be noted at the outset that it is a well recognized
principle that admissions and confessions are not objectionable as
hearsay. Cf. Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal. 2d 409, 71 P.2d 220
(1937); Anthus v. Rail Joint Co., 231 N.Y. 557, 132 N.E. 887 (1921).
An admission differs from a confession in that the former is an
acknowledgment of facts and circumstances which, if taken in
connection with proof of other facts, will permit an inference of
guilt, while the latter is a acknowledgment of guilt of the criminal
act or a part thereof. Gulotta v. United States, 113 F.2d 863 (8th
Cir. 1940).
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